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The Dual Crisis in Science and Society~
BARRY COMMONER
Chairman, Department of Botany
Director, Center for the Biology of Natural Systems
Washington University, St. Louis

Our present achievements in science and technology appear to contrast vividly with our present lack of
achievement in solving social problems. We can nourish a man in the
supreme isolation of outer space-but
we cannot adequately feed the children of Calcutta or Harlem. We hope
to analyze life on other planets-but
we have not yet learned to understand
our own neighbors. We are attempting to live on the moon-but we cannot yet live peacefully on our own
planet.
The usual explanation of this frightening paradox is that we are competent in the realm of science because
no value judgments are demanded
and that we are tragically incompetent in dealing with each other because this requires adjustment between personal values and ·t he social
good-a capacity that frequently
eludes us.
I should like to propose another
explanation-that the contrast between our technological competence
and our ethical inepitude is only ap-

parent. We are tragically blind, I believe, not only about our fellowmen
but also about important aspects of
nature; we are dangerously incompetent in our relations to the natural
world as well as in our relations to
each other.
Our society is threatened not only
by a growing social crisis but also by
a technological crisis. In our eager
~earch for the benefits of modern
science and technology, we have
blundered unwittingly into serious
hazards:
We used to be told that nuclear
testing was perfectly harmless. Only
now, long after the damage has been
done, do we know differently.
We produced power plants and
automobiles that enveloped our cities
in smog-before anyone understood
its harmful effects on health.
We synthesized and disseminated
the new insecticides-before anyone
learned that they also kill birds and
might be harmful to people.
We produced detergents and put
billions of pounds of them into our
surface waters-before we realized
that they would pollute our water
supplies because they do not break
down in our disposal systems.
We are now, in Vietnam, conducting chemical warfare with herbicides,
although we cannot predict the con-

*Reprinted from Today's Education, October, 1968. Dr. Commoner discussed this
topic at greater length in an address presented at the 1968 National Conference on
Higher Education of the American Association for Higher Education, an NEA
department.
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trained to analyze the complex forces
at work in such issues, they have a
capacity for rational thought that renders them to some degree detached
from the emotions that encumber the
ordinary citizen's views of these calamitous issues.
In my view, this argument has a
basic flaw-the resolution of every
social issue imposed on us by modem scientific progress can be shown
to require a decision based on value
judgments rather than on objective
scientific laws.
What scientific procedure can determine, for example, whether the
benefits to the national interest of
nuclear resting outweigh the hazards
of fallout? How can scientific method
determine whether the proponents of
urban superhighways or those who
complain about the resultant smog
are in the right? What scientific principle can tell us how to make the
choice-which may be forced upon
us by the insecticide problem-between the shade of the elm tree and
the song of the robin?
Certainly, science can validly describe the hard facts about these issues. But the choioe of the balance
point between benefit and hazard is
a value judgment; it is based on ideals
of social good or mortality or religion
-not on science. And if this choice
is a social and moral judgment, it
ought to be made, not by scientists
and technologists alone, but by all
citizens.
How can a citizen make such judgments? Deciding these issues requires
a confrontation between human values and rather complex scientific data'

sequences of this novel type of warfare.
We are fully prepared to conduct
a nuclear war-even though we do not
know whether its vast effects on life,
on soil, and on the weather will destroy our civilization.
Clearly, we hav,e compiled a record
of serious failures in reoent encounters
with the environment. This record
shows that ",e have thus far failed to
understand the environment well
enough to make new large-soale intrusions on it with a reasonable expectation of accurately predicting the
cons·equenoes.
This failure raises two important
questions about the relation between
science and technology and human
values'. What are the relative rnles of
science and human desires in the resolution of the important issues generated by our failures in the environment? What are the causes of these
failures, and how do they illuminate
the dual crisis in technology and human affairs? How can we resolve the
grave public issues that' have been
generated by our new assaults on the
integrity of the environment?
Sometimes it is . suggested that
sinoe .scientists and engineers have
made the bombs, insecticides, and
autos, they ought to be responsible
for deciding how to deal with the resultant hazards.
More cogently, it is argued that
scientists and technologists . are
uniquely competent to resolve these
issues because they are in possession
of the relevant technical facts that
are essential to .an understanding of
the major public issues generared by
new technology. Since scientists are
4

that most citizens are poorly prepared
to understand.
The solution demands a · new duty
of scientists. As the custodiaris of the
technical knowledge relevant to these
public issues, scientists have an obligation to bring this information before their fellow citizens in understandable terms.
But first, scientists themselves must
determine the caus•es of our recent
failures in the environment and learn
from such a determination about the
relationship between science and
technology and human values. If we
are to succeed as inhabitants of a
world increasingly transformed by
technology, we need to undertake a
searching reassessment of our attitudes toward the natural world and
the technology that intrudes on it.
Among primitive people, man is always seen as a dependent part of nature, a frail reed in a harsh world,
governed by immutable processes
that must be obeyed if he is to survive. And the knowledge of nature
achieved by primitive peoples is remarkable.
The African bushman's habitat is
one of the most stringent on earth:
Food is scarce; water, even mol'e so;
and extremes of weather come rapidly. The bushman survives in this environment because his understanding
of it is incredibly intimate. A bushman can, for example, return after
many months and miles of travel to
find a single underground tuber,
noted in his previous wanderings,
when he needs it for his water supply.
We claim to have escaped from
such dependence on the environment.
While the bushman must squeeze

water from a searched-out tuber, we
get ours by the tum of a tap. Instead
of trackless wastes, we have the grid
of city streets. Instead of seeking the
sun's heat when we need it and shunning it when it is too strong, we warm
ourselves or cool ourselves with manmade machines. And we have thus
become enticed into the nearly fatal
illusion that we can ignore the balance of nature.
The truth is tragically different. We
ha¥e become not less dependent on
the balance of nature but more dependent on it Modem technology has
so stressed the web of processes in
the living ,e nvironment that there is
little leeway left in the system.
I would contend, therefore, that despite our vaunted mastery of nature,
despite our brilliant success in managing those processes that can be confined to a laboratory or a factory, we
in the "advanced" countries are far
less competent inhabitants of our environment than bushmen are of theirs.
This reflects, I believe, a basic inadequacy in modem science-neglect
of systems and processes that are intrinsically complex. The systems at
risk in environmental pollution are
natural, and because they are natural
they are complex. Hence they are not
readily approached by the atomistic
methodology so characteristic of
much of modem biological research.
Water pollutants stress the total
ecological web that ties together the
numerous organisms inhabiting lakes
and rivers; their effects on the whole
natural system are not adequately
described by laboratory studies of
pure cultures of separate organisms.
Smog attacks the self-protective mech5

10 or 20 hours of practice, the machiue got the hang of it, and from

anism of the human lung; its noxious
effects on man are not accountable
by an influence on a single enzyme or
even a single tissue.
If, for the sake of analytical detail,
molecular constituents are isolated
from the smashed remains of a cell or
single organisms are separted from
their natural neighbors, what is lost
is the network of interrelationships
that crucially determines the properties of the natural whole. And this
s11ggests that any new basic knowledge, if it is to elucidate environmental biology and guide our efforts to
understand and control pollution,
must be relevant to the natural biological systems that are the arena in
. which these problems exist.
Nor is our neglect of complex systems limited to environmental biology.
This is quickly revealed, for example,
by a brief inquiry into the state of
modem computer science. Shortly before he died, Norbert Wiener, the
mathematician who did so much to
develop cybernetics, the science that
guides the design of computers,
warned us about the problem. He
cited, as a parable, experience with
computers that had been programmed
to play checkers. Engineers built into
the electronic circuits a correct under~,t~nding of the rules of checkers and
also a way of judging ( from a stored
record of its opponents' moves) what
moves were most likely to beat the
human opponents.
Dr. Wiener described the results of
the checker tournaments between the
computer and its human programmers: The machine started out playing an accurate but uninspired game
that was easy to beat; but after about

then on the human player always lost
and the machine won.
Dr. Wiener concluded that it had
become technically possible to build
automatic machines able to carry out
very complex activities that elude the
comprehension of their operators and
that "most definitely escape from the
complete effective control of the man
who has made them."
Recently this difficulty has become
painfully evident to the specialists
who are attempting to manage the
operation of the current generation of
electronic computers. They are extraordinarily frustrated men. They have
at their disposal beautifully designed
machines capable, in theory, of complex interdigitation of numerous mathematical operations. However, the
operators have not yet learned how
to operate these machines at their full
capacity for complex computations
without encountering inexplicable errors.
A spectacular example of a similar
difficulty is the New England power
blackout of November 1965, in which
a complex powerline network designed to effect an even distribution
of generating capacity over an 80,000square-mile area failed. Instead of
providing outside power to a local
Canadian power system that had suffered a relay failure, the network
acted in reverse, causing every connected power system to shut down.
And a frightening potential .catastrophe lies in the possibility that the
complex, computer-guided missile systems-which can in minutes thrust us
6

oratories; instead, we must use our
knowledge to help improve the world.
If we accept this obligation, how
can we make it jibe with the principle
of academic freedom, which holds
that every scholar should be free to
pursue the studies that interest him
and free to express whatever conclusions the evidence and the powers of
his mind may generate?
There is no simple answer to this
question, but Alexander Meiklejohn,
who contributed much to the making
of the modem American university,
gave us a useful guide. According to
Meikeljohn, academic freedom is not
a special immunity from social responsibility but, on the contrary, a
basic part of the duty that the university and the scholar owe to society.
The university, he believed, is an
instituiton established by society to
fill its own need for knowledge about
the nature of the world and man. The
scholar's search for the truth is thus
not merely an obligation to himself,
to his profession, or to the university,
but to society. And in this search,
open and unconstrained discourse is
essential, for no scholar's work is complete or faultless.
Our duty, then, is not to truth for
its own sake, but to truth for society's
sake. In Meiklejohn's words: "Our
final responsibility as scholars and
teachers is not to the truth'. It is to
the people who need the truth."
Hence, the scholar's duty inevitably
becomes coupled with social issues.
The scholar will become concerned
not only with social needs, but with
social goals as well. And if society expects the scholar to honor a duty to-

into the last World War-are equally
susceptible to such failures.
It is not a coincidence, I believe,
that the scientific and technological
problems affecting the human condition involve inherently complex systems. Life, as we live it, is rarely encompassed by a single academic discipline. Real problems that touch our
lives and impinge on what we value
rarely fit into the neat categories of
the college catalog: medieval history,
nuclear physics, molecular biology.
For example, to encompass in our
minds the terrifying deterioration of
our cities we need to know not only
the principles of economics, architecture, and social planning, but also
the chemistry of air quality areas, the
biology of water systems, and the
ecology of the domestic rat and the
cockroach. In a word, we need to understand science and technology that
are relevant to the human condition.
However, we, in the university community, have been brought up in a
different tradition. We have a justified pride in our intellectual independence ·a nd know-for we often
have to battle to maintain it-how essential this independence is to the
search for truth. But academic people may sometimes tend to translate
intellectual independence into a kind
of mandatory disinterest in all problems that do not arise in their own
minds-an approach that may in some
cases cut them off from their students
and from the real and urgent needs
of society.
I believe we university scientists
have a clear obligation to the society
that supports us. We have no right to
retreat behind the walls of our lab7

ward the development of socially significant knowledge, society must
equally honor his freedom openly to
express a concern with social goals.
Those whom we serve should see in
our zeal for this freedom not the
selfish exercise of privilege, but a response to these solemn obligations.
The academic world is now emerging from a long period of silence, a
silence that has obscured the true
purpose of the university and has
weakened its service to society. We
now hear many new voices in the
universities. Some speak in the traditional well-modulated language of
the scholar, some in the sharper tones
of dissent, and some in a new language that is less concerned with
transmitting ideas than feelings. But
behind nearly all the voices is a mutual concern with the quality of life.
Among our students this concern
is often reduced to its most elementary level-a demand for the right to
life itself. And this is natural, for our
students represent the first generation
of human beings who have grown to
adulthood under the constant threat
of instant annihilation.
Our own generation is often criticized because we have, with our own
minds and hands, created the weapon
of total human destruction; we invented the first atomic bomb. But an
even greater sin is that our generation has become numb to the frightful
meaniog of what we have done.
The newer generation has a different way of sensing things. If nuclear death threatens our generation
with an earlier end to a life already
in part fulfilled, it threatens our students with the total loss of a life yet

to be fulfilled. They, far better than
we, can sense the total inhumanity of
the civilization that we share.
If they fail to suggest a reasonable
way out, the more thoughtful of them
have at least defined what it is that
we must try to escape. We need the
sharpness of their definition of the issue; they need from us the .competence and steady purpose that is the
gift of experience. Together we can,
I believe, secure for all of us what is
so gravely threatened by the dual
crisis in science and in society-a
technology that serves the life of man
and a society that cherishes the right
to life.

Rock and Mineral
Exchange Service
Elementary and Secondary school
science teachers interested in swapping rocks, minerals, and other earth
science materials are hereby notified
that a clearinghouse for earth science
materials exchange has been established in Arlington Heights, Illinois.
To take advantage of this free, volunteer service, send a list ( with quantities) of minerals, rocks, fossils, or
earth science curriculum materials
you want, and a list of materials
( with quantities) you can swap, to
Mr. Charles A. Wall, Science Department, South Junior High School, 301
West South Street, Arlington Heights,
Illinois 60005. Be sure to enclose a
stamped, self-addressed envelope
with your request.
You will be supplied with the
names and addresses of people who
can supply your needs on a swap basis.
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